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from shallow criticisms and vindicates his legit-
imate claims to pre-eminence at the bar of both 
the scholarly judgement and public opinion. A 
lengthy bibliography at the end of the book adds 
value to the book. 
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Hannah Arendt wrote about evil being so banal that one does not recognise it when 
it is encountered in its esse (See Hannah Arendt, 
Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of 
Evil (New York: Penguin, 1963). Arendt is central 
to any study of evil today and in her Afterword in 
this revised edition of her book originally pub-
lished in 2002, Neiman re-evaluates Arendt. We 
will have the opportunity to speak of Arendt at 
the end of this review. 
Jean Baudrillard sees evil as an intractable 
virus which has infected the cosmos:
In a society which seeks—by prophylactic meas-
ures, by annihilating its own natural referents, 
by whitewashing violence, by exterminating all 
germs and all of the accursed share, by perform-
ing cosmetic surgery on the negative—to con-
cern itself solely with quantified management 
and with the discourse of the Good, in a society 
where it is no longer possible to speak Evil, Evil 
has metamorphosed into all the viral and ter-
roristic forms that obsess us ( Jean Baudrillard, 
The Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phe-
nomena, trans. James Benedict (London: Verso, 
2002),  81).
Susan Neiman’s book makes it possible once 
again to speak of evil explicitly; and thus seek 
ways to annihilate it. Her act of including the 
word ‘evil’ in the title of the book is the begin-
ning of her cultural work as a philosopher who 
continues and responds seriously to the works of 
both Arendt and Baudrillard. Naming anything, 
and in this case, evil as it is, demands existential 
honesty in an atmosphere which does not want 
to discuss this ancient problem of evil which the 
Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev felt was 
unsolvable. Neiman’s book’s praxis lies in its very 
existence: if we neglect the study of evil, geno-
cides and terrorism will continue. Neiman, unlike 
most career philosophers, discusses terrorism in 
detail near the end of her book. The book under 
review has established the urgency of studying 
evil if one wants to truly comprehend what the 
philosopher-turned-novelist, Iris Murdoch had 
called the ‘Sovereignty of the Good’ (See Iris Mur-
doch, The Sovereignty of Good (London: Routledge, 
1967)), which is the telos of all history, including 
Neiman’s own reading of the history of philoso-
phy as we find here. Neiman does not write on evil 
to exalt in it but to show how the sovereign nature 
of the good has been repeatedly apparently dis-
placed by the existence of evil. Evil is no privatio 
boni or simulation vide Jean Baudrillard; it is very 
much a happening phenomenon. This reviewer 
has discussed about evil in Subhasis Chattopa-
dhyay, ‘Prolegomenon to the Study of Evil’, Pra-
buddha Bharata, 118/4 (April 2013), 278–81, 293. 
Neiman has done successfully what no other 
contemporary philosopher has the temerity to 
do: she has shown how the history of philosophy 
demands new (mis)readings qua responses since 
evil is inherent in the esse of the idea of the being 
in the here and the now. Except Arendt and Bau-
drillard and to some extent Giorgio Agamben, 
contemporary philosophers have been silent on 
the problem of evil. Neiman says:
The picture of modern philosophy as cen-
tered in epistemology and driven by the desire to 
ground our representations is so tenacious that 
some philosophers are prepared to bite the bul-
let and declare the effort simply wasted. Rorty, 
for example, finds it easier to reject modern phil-
osophy altogether than to reject the standard 
accounts of its history. His narrative is more po-
lemical than most, but it’s a polemical version of 
the story told in most philosophy departments 
in the second half of the twentieth century. ... 
What began as metaphysics—the description of 
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the basic structure of reality—ended as episte-
mology: the attempt to ground the foundations 
of our knowledge (5–6).
Empirical research bears out the truth of her 
important thesis that the larger thematic study of 
the problem of evil took a backseat in professional 
discourses of philosophy during the last century 
and even in this century professional philosophers 
shy away from discussing the problem of evil since 
contemporary philosophy has engaged itself with 
‘timeless matters’ like ‘Goodness, truth, and beauty’ 
(xvii). Yet ‘Every time we make the judgment this 
ought not to have happened, we are stepping onto 
a path that leads straight to the problem of evil. ... 
For it involves questions more natural, urgent, and 
pervasive than the skeptical epistemological quan-
daries said to drive modern philosophy’ (5). Nei-
man is bold enough to attack Richard Rorty; a fact 
that will ensure that she remains a prophetic and 
therefore a marginalised voice within mainstream 
philosophy. Martha Nussbaum, in her magnum 
opus The Fragility of Goodness, for instance, keeps 
defining what Aristotle thought about the good life 
(See Martha C Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness 
(London: Cambridge University, 2001)). She, like 
Neiman, is a Jew; but she simply cannot face the 
spectre of Hitler. Yet she is venerated globally as 
the philosopher of Cosmopolitanism. How does 
reviving Cosmopolitanism from the detritus of the 
philosophy of the Cynics help one prevent the re-
currence of the rise of another Hitler escapes this 
reviewer. Nussbaum nowhere attacks Rorty or A J 
Ayer—if she did so, she would not have been known 
universally as a humanist. Neiman errs on the side 
of being a rigorous scholar and pays for her rigour 
by remaining relatively yet undeservedly unknown. 
In this book Neiman shows us how the Hitler 
event should have been tackled by professional 
philosophers and what exactly needs to be done 
to prevent mass genocides of the nature com-
mitted by the Nazis. Neiman studies the Lisbon 
earthquake and discusses Leibnitz and then cor-
rectly points out the epistemic retreat enacted 
by contemporary thinkers—this statement too 
has ensured that she remains an academic par-
iah. She is the only voice writing today asking the 
right questions: what happened to philosophis-
ing which dealt with the hard questions of life? 
Why is it that some of the best minds of this and 
the last centuries avoid the issue of Hitler? Why 
do philosophy courses stress the abstract over the 
practical lived experience of the individual in the 
here and the now? Evil, that is ‘absolute wrongdo-
ing that leaves no room for account or expiation’ 
(3), apparently defies all analyses. Thus, the reality 
and the inexplicability of evil forces an otherwise 
rigorous Alvin Plantinga to lose himself in the jug-
glery of logic while justifying the truth of evil and a 
benign God. Neiman’s concern in this book is not 
God per se but rather the reality and inevitability 
of evil in all its forms and particularly, for example, 
why David Hume needs to be reread to under-
stand evil—Neiman reads Immanuel Kant and 
then through him judges Hume and how the latter 
had effected the current course of philosophy and 
emasculated the academic domain or the study of 
philosophy. The section ‘The Impotence of Rea-
son: David Hume’ in the second chapter is a tour 
de force in itself that should be made compulsory 
reading in all philosophy syllabi. This reviewer has 
scoured the internet and called up professional 
philosophers asking them whether they have read 
Neiman’s contentions regarding Hume vis-à-vis 
Immanuel Kant elsewhere. None has. This chapter 
is sufficient reason for us to consider Neiman as 
one of the greatest philosophers alive. 
Philosophers are notoriously bad stylists, but 
Neiman’s style is cosy and jargon-free: 
The question could be raised during a conver-
sational lull in a good salon: would you live 
your life over, if given the chance? Eighteenth-
century thinkers took a rest from more serious 
business by discussing it. Few of them were en-
tirely clear about the form of the question. Were 
they seeking an empirical survey, or a normative 
claim? Were they asking whether people in gen-
eral, and any one of us in particular, would in 
fact repeat their lives over—or whether it would, 
on balance, be reasonable to do so? (206). 
This is how Neiman begins writing on Ni-
etzsche in the section ‘Eternal Choices: Nietzsche 
on Redemption’ in the third chapter. Anyone fa-
miliar with Nietzsche will know from the title 
that Neiman is going to scrutinise Nietzsche in a 
way he has not been evaluated before: one should 
read this section for the scope of Neiman’s own 
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readings in philosophy and ancient Greek drama 
and for her power to connect philosophers as 
disparate as Voltaire and Hegel with Nietzsche 
keeping in mind her stated aim in this book. She 
never forgets to point out how all major Contin-
ental philosophers were writing willy-nilly on the 
problem of evil. She establishes that contempor-
ary philosophers have got their priorities at least 
partially wrong: philosophy is in fact a coming 
to terms with the reality of evil. This reviewer 
recommends this section for another reason: 
stylistically it is one of the most lucid and witty 
treatments of Nietzsche that can be found in any 
history of philosophy. Neiman is aware that what 
she has written will not be accepted by her peers: 
hence she appends to the title ‘An Alternative 
Philosophy of History’. But this is the history of 
philosophy which should be taught to neophytes 
and not the drab stuff which is the lot allotted as 
compulsory reading to philosophy majors. 
Neiman is one of the few philosophers living 
today who can write about the reality of the Jew-
ish cabal or ‘lobby’, and draw the ire of other Jew-
ish philosophers: 
Let me take an anti-Semitic bull by its horns and 
address the most common suspicion. There is 
indeed a Jewish lobby, more accurately known 
as aipac, which seeks to support right-wing Is-
raeli governments who deflect responsibility for 
their own policies by emphasizing the ways in 
which Jews have been victims, particularly at the 
hands of the Nazis. But it is not responsible for 
the movement of popular consciousness from 
Hiroshima to Auschwitz. For decades follow-
ing the war, survivors of Auschwitz were viewed 
with shame and even disgust; the newly founded 
Jewish state wanted heroes, not victims (345). 
Neiman is frankly Jewish; she is ready to cri-
tique her Jewish peers and this is a kind of trans-
parency not to be found even in Jacques Derrida, 
Michel Foucault, or Emmanuel Lévinas. All of 
them were Jews reacting to their understanding 
of the Torah and the Fall of Jerusalem, which is 
repeated in the Holocaust in a Nietzschean trans-
valuation of values and in the case of Derrida and 
Foucault; their own excommunications by ortho-
dox Jews. Neiman’s self-critique as a Jewish phil-
osopher is refreshing. Her book The Unity of 
Reason: Rereading Kant (See Susan Neiman, The 
Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant (New York: Ox-
ford University, 1997)) had established her as a 
moral philosopher and this book secures her place 
as the only philosopher writing now worth reading, 
both for the truth about the history of philosophy 
as well as the real and not an alternative history of 
philosophy, as has been mentioned above. 
Neiman contrasts Martin Heidegger with The-
odor Adorno’s conception and expectations of 
death (309). Her analysis of Heidegger is perfect 
within the context of this book. But she misses the 
point that it was Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927) 
which triggered the retreat of philosophy into epis-
temology and to be precise, to become the study of 
language and other abstractions. Heidegger’s com-
plicity with the Nazis is well documented. 
In this edition of the book we have Neiman 
revisiting Otto Adolf Eichmann. She takes into 
account recent historical research and partly 
modifies Eichmann’s evaluation by Hannah 
Arendt. Neiman sees through Eichmann’s pose as 
a humdrum bureaucrat and through now avail-
able documents from Argentina where Eichmann 
hid himself, she sees Eichmann as the true butcher 
that he was; a man well aware of Kantian categor-
ical imperatives but bent on not applying these 
moral imperatives to his own butchery of the Jews. 
He boasted in Argentina of wanting to extermi-
nate every Jew on earth. During his trial in Jeru-
salem, Eichmann as it now emerges, pretended to 
be just another regular person doing his job under 
orders from his bosses. Eichmann through this 
tactic of being banal wanted to live on and escape 
punishment—evil never wants to effect its own 
erasure from the world as it is. 
One last point needs to be mentioned about 
Neiman’s thorough research of evil—she asks the 
question whether the bombing of Hiroshima was 
necessary? Chances are that the Americans knew 
that destroying Hiroshima was not needed to win 
the war. It takes courage to revisit the evil that 
happened in Japan during the Second World War 
and accept that this evil was unleashed by those 
who were purportedly good.
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